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Abstract: This article provides a review of global energy subsidies—of definitions and 
estimation techniques, their type and scope, their drawbacks, and effective ways to reform them.  
Based on an assessment of both policy reports and peer-reviewed studies, this article presents 
evidence that energy subsidies could reach into the trillions of dollars each year. It also 
highlights how most subsidies appear to offer net costs to society, rather than benefits, in the 
form of government deficits, increased waste, shortages of energy fuels, and aggravated 
environmental impacts, among others.  The review then talks about how tools such as best 
practices in measurement and estimation, subsidy elimination, impact studies, and adjustment 
packages can dramatically reorient subsidies so that they become more socially and 
environmentally sustainable.  It also argues that such efforts need to explicitly learn from 
previous successes and recognize the importance of political economy, the possible winners and 
losers to subsidy reform. The final part proposes a future research agenda. 
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Reviewing, Reforming, and Rethinking Global Energy Subsidies: Towards a Political 
Economy Research Agenda 
Introduction 
Energy subsidies have emerged to become one of the most polemic, pervasive, and 
political energy policy tools.  On the one hand, their often-stated justification is that subsidies 
help target public resources into neglected areas of infrastructure and development; can spur 
much-needed innovation; and/or are instrumental at achieving various social or technological 
goals.1 2  Some energy subsidies, notably low-income assistance to poor households under the 
Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program or Weatherization Assistance Program in the 
United States3, or the Warm Front Program in the UK4, have served a valuable social mission. 
Others, such as those supporting the early efforts of the Rural Electrification Administration5, 
were essential in the expansion of what was at that time a new and novel technology, the 
electricity grid.  Despite many implementation problems, subsidized energy does provide an 
important social safety net across the Middle East and Africa.6  For instance, in South Africa 
subsidies for Liquefied Petroleum Gas stoves have been key to the rapid adoption of more 
sustainable, less carbon-intensive cooking practices that also save households money.7   
On the other hand, many subsidies serve almost no discernible public good—and in some 
ways, they can do considerable bad.8   When addressing the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Kiyo Akasaka, Deputy Secretary General, went so far 
as to argue that “Subsidies often introduce economic, environmental, and social distortions with 
unintended consequences. They are expensive for governments and may not achieve their 
objectives while also inducing harmful environmental and social outcomes.”9  More recently, 
Secretary-General of the OECD Angel Gurría impassionate argued that “We need strong, 
Global Energy Subsidies 3 
 
credible and predictable climate policies, in particular a price on carbon and the elimination of 
both consumer and producer subsidies that support incumbent fossil fuels. These are, in climate 
terms, ‘sins of commission’ for which there is no excuse.”10  Energy subsidies, moreover, are 
increasingly becoming parts of costly and protracted trade disputes, creating friction between 
countries.  One study found that energy subsidies were behind 14.5% of the trade disputes 
handled by the World Trade Organization between 2010 and 2013.11 
This article provides a global review of energy subsidies (primarily but not exclusively 
those for fossil fuels and nuclear power).  It assesses the type and scope of subsidies, how they 
are defined and measured, their drawbacks, effective ways to reform them, and future research 
questions.  Based on an assessment of both policy reports and peer-reviewed studies, this article 
presents evidence that energy subsidies could reach into the trillions of dollars each year. It also 
highlights how most subsidies appear to offer net costs to society, rather than benefits, in the 
form of government deficits, increased waste, shortages of energy fuels, crime associated with 
illicit fuel trade, and aggravated environmental impacts, among others.  The final parts of the 
review also discuss various policy reform efforts as well as associated political economy 
implications and future research questions.  
Defining subsidies and understanding estimation techniques  
To begin, defining an energy subsidy can be fraught with difficulty.  The World Trade 
Organization defines a subsidy as “a financial contribution by a government, or agent of a 
government, that confers a benefit on its recipients.”12  The United Nations and International 
Energy Agency define an energy subsidy as “any measure that keeps prices for consumers below 
market levels, or for producers above market levels, or that reduces costs for consumers and 
producers”13   The Global Subsidies Initiative and the International Institute for Sustainable 
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Development add that subsidies can do this in complex ways.  They can directly or indirectly 
transfer liabilities, forgo government revenue, provide goods or services below market value, or 
offer direct income or price support for a preferred technology.14  As Table 1 reveals, at least 17 
different types of energy subsidies are on the books for many countries around the world, and 
most of these were oriented towards lowering the cost of energy production, though others did 
focus on raising prices and still others lowering prices for users. 15 16 17 18 
Table 1: Typology of Global Energy Subsidies  
Type of subsidy Example(s) How it Works 
Lowers cost of 
production 
Raises price to 
disfavored 
producer 
Lowers price to 
consumer 
Direct financial 
transfer 
Grants to 
producers 
X   
Grants to 
consumers 
  X 
Low-interest or 
preferential 
loans 
X   
Preferential tax 
treatment 
Rebates or 
exemptions on 
royalties, sales 
taxes, producer 
levies and tariffs 
X   
 Investment tax 
credits 
X  X 
 Production tax 
credits 
X   
 Accelerated 
depreciation 
X   
 State sponsored 
loan guarantees 
X   
Trade 
restrictions 
Quotas, technical 
restrictions, and 
trade embargoes 
 X  
 Import duties 
and tariffs 
 X  
Energy-related 
services 
provided by 
Direct 
investment in 
X   
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government at 
less than full 
cost 
energy 
infrastructure 
 Publicly 
sponsored R&D 
X   
 Liability 
insurance 
X   
 Free storage of 
waste or fuel 
X   
 Free transport X   
Regulation of the 
energy sector 
Demand 
guarantees and 
mandated 
deployment rates 
X X  
 Price controls 
and rate caps 
 X X 
 Market-access 
restrictions and 
standards 
 X  
Source: Modified from Trevor Morgan, Energy Subsidies: Their Magnitude, How They Affect 
Energy Investment and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Prospects for Reform (Geneva: 
UNFCCC Secretariat Financial and Technical Support Programme, June 2007). 
 
 Given this breath and complexity, as well as interaction with other policies, energy 
subsidies can be pervasive, yet difficult to identify.  Consider the example of one small 
subsector, transport of energy fuels.  In the United States, inland waterway maintenance for the 
delivery of coal barges is often provided by national and local governments, but only partially 
supported by user fees.  Coastal ports and harbors receiving oil, natural gas, and coal are 
subsidized by federal and other government entities.  Most roadways used to deliver various 
energy fuels are owned, operated, and maintained by municipalities, funded through local tax 
dollars.  The interstate highway system in the United States received enormous federal subsidies 
in the 1950s and 1960s and even today is not fully funded via gasoline taxes. Many rail lines 
receive state subsidies for labor and fuel, many pipeline rights of way are government backed, 
and transmission extensions to rural areas are often priced below cost because of a “duty to 
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serve” customers.19  Because they are indirect and hidden, these types of subsidies rarely “count” 
in official government audits and documents.    
 Therefore, analysts have developed various methodologies and estimation techniques to 
try and grapple with the scope and extent of energy subsidies.  Generally, as Table 2 
summarizes, four approaches exist.  The simplest and most common is an estimation of 
government support (including forgone revenue such as tax credits, or accounting for only direct 
expenditure). Many countries attempt to release such data, usually annually or every few years, 
often through ministries or departments such as the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
U.S. Government Accountability office, or the Danish Energy Agency.  
Table 2: Overview of four subsidy measurement approaches 
 
Approach  Description Strengths Limitations  Institutional 
examples 
Program-specific 
estimation 
Quantifies value 
of specific 
government 
programs to 
particular 
industries; 
aggregates 
programs into 
overall level of 
support 
Captures transfers 
whether or not 
they affect markets 
Does not address 
questions of 
ultimate 
incidence or 
pricing 
distortions  
Various 
government 
ministries 
and 
departments  
Price-gap  Evaluates 
positive or 
negative “gaps” 
between the 
domestic price of 
energy and the 
delivered price of 
energy of 
comparable 
products from 
abroad  
Can be estimated 
with more limited 
data, good 
indicator of 
pricing or trade 
distortions 
Sensitive to 
assumptions 
regarding market 
prices, 
undertakes full 
value of 
subsidies because 
it ignores 
transfers that 
may not effect 
markets  
International 
Energy 
Agency 
Inventory 
(producer support 
estimate / 
Systematic 
method to 
aggregate 
Attempts to 
capture a more 
holistic 
Data intensive, 
and empirical 
data for many 
OECD 
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consumer support 
estimate) 
transfer plus 
market supports 
to particular 
industries  
measurement of 
support, can reveal 
separate effects on 
producer and 
consumer markets 
markets remains 
limited  
Externalities  Assesses the full 
social cost of 
subsidies 
including 
normally un-
priced effects 
external to the 
market place 
Tries to measure 
not only holistic 
measurement of 
subsidy support 
but broader social, 
environmental, 
and economic 
impacts  
Many 
externalities 
difficult to 
monetize, also 
data-intensive 
and prone to very 
large estimates 
International 
Monetary 
Fund 
 
Source: Modified from Koplow, D. and Dernbach, J. (2001). Federal fossil fuel subsidies and 
greenhouse gas emissions: A case study of increasing transparency for fiscal policy. Annual 
Review of Energy and the Environment 26, 361–389; as well as Masami Kojima and Doug 
Koplow, Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Approaches and Valuation, World Bank Group Policy Research 
Working Paper 7220, March, 2015. 
 
The “price-gap” approach calculates the difference between the reference price for 
energy in an actual or imputed market-based transaction and the price actually paid by, or 
officially charged to, an end user (usually a residential, commercial, or industrial customer) for 
that same energy delivered to the same location at the same time. The International Energy 
Agency utilizes this approach, and it often determines positive gaps on the assumption that if 
energy is sold at a price below what it would have been in a competitive, deregulated market, the 
explanation for the lower price must be some government intervention. This usually takes the 
form of a subsidy, a cross-subsidy, or some form of price regulation including an export tax or 
restriction.20  
The “inventory approach” attempts to list policies using different subsidy-delivery 
mechanisms in a catalogue, seeking to document and quantify a wide range of government 
interventions in energy markets, utilizing a mix of support delivery mechanisms. The goal of an 
inventory approach is twofold: to help government officials and citizens understand the overall 
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scale of public spending and policies promoting particular energy pathways, and to help identify 
the most important leverage points for reform. An inventory ideally encompasses all direct 
expenditures by the government, forgone revenues due to targeted tax and other fiscal 
concessions, and other forms of support such as below-market provision of credit and insurance, 
as well as market transfers to or from consumers and/or producers. Analysts commonly utilize 
producer support estimate (PSE) and consumer support estimate (CSE) techniques to meet this 
task. 21 
 A fourth and final type of estimation technique attempts to draw from any of the earlier 
approaches and then adds in the cost of un-internalized (and often unintended) externalities.   
There are divergent views on how to deal with externalities, ranging from not counting them as 
subsidies to classifying all externalities associated with fuel production or consumption as fuel 
subsidies. As we will see below, inclusion or exclusion of subsidies can account for a variance of 
$500 billion to more than $5 trillion in valuation of global fossil fuel subsidies.  Currently, the 
IEA and the OECD consider such externalities to be outside the scope of subsidy measurement, 
whereas the IMF includes the cost of consumption-related externalities in its “post-tax” subsidy 
estimations, counting as subsidies failure to charge for the economic damage caused. The 
underlying assumption is externalities are a form of damage cost that should have been captured 
in the price of the fuel.  
Estimating Global Energy Subsidy Expenditures  
With these differences in definitions and valuation in mind, practically every energy 
system has been subsidized at some point.  Oil wells were given free licenses in the 1860s. 
Coalmines received tax breaks in the 1880s and 1890s.  Natural gas turbines benefited from 
military research on jet engines and rocket boosters.  Solar panels received some of their earliest 
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support from NASA for their ability to provide electricity in outer space.  Nuclear power has 
long been backed by steep contributions from the defense industry and benefited tremendously 
from the shifting of long-tail risks (waste management and accident risks primarily) from the 
investor onto the taxpayer.22  Even today, renewable energy sources such as wind turbines and 
geothermal power plants receive tax credits in many countries; coal receives special tax 
treatment and black-lung benefits paid by government in countries as diverse as China, Russia, 
and the United States; oil and gas receives huge tax shelters as well as research subsidies.23 24   
Because of this complexity and rich history, many different estimates and projections of 
the amount of subsidies exist.  One international survey of 171 countries, using the price-gap 
approach, found that in 29 nations, refined gasoline and diesel prices were lower per unit than the 
international price of crude oil and below the minimum retail level in competitive markets in 52 
additional countries—implying the existence of significant subsidies.25  Figure 1 shows some of 
the results of this survey.  An extreme example of such subsidies is Venezuela, where the price 
for gasoline was a mere 6 cents per gallon (or 1.6 cents per liter)—less than one fiftieth of what 
somebody in California pays—perhaps explaining why gasoline consumption there is 40 percent 
greater than any other Latin American country and three times the average for the region.26 
Figure 1: Subsidies for Gasoline and Diesel in Selected Countries 
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Source: Redrawn from Trevor Morgan, Energy Subsidies: Their Magnitude, How They Affect 
Energy Investment and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Prospects for Reform (Geneva: 
UNFCCC Secretariat Financial and Technical Support Programme, June 2007). 
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The International Energy Agency has been tracking energy subsidies through an online 
database and estimated in 2014 that “fossil-fuel consumption subsidies” totaled, using a price 
gap approach, about $493 billion.27  As they summarize in Table 3, subsidies are extremely high 
in particular countries, with Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela all seeing rates 
above 70%.  In Iran in particular, the IEA reports that energy subsidies accounted for roughly 
one-fifth of national Gross Domestic Product. 
Table 3: Energy Subsidization Rates per capita and per GDP for selected countries, 2014 
Country Average subsidization rate 
(%) 
Subsidy per capita 
($/person) 
Total subsidy as share of GDP 
(%) 
Algeria 77.8 524 9.4 
Angola 39.0 110 1.9 
Argentina 33.5 326 2.5 
Azerbaijan 23.6 154 2.0 
Bahrain 59.9 1697 6.7 
Bangladesh 25.8 19 1.7 
Bolivia 43.6 177 5.6 
Brunei 45.6 900 2.5 
China 2.2 13 0.2 
Chinese 
Taipei 
0.5 7 0.0 
Colombia 0.0 0 0.0 
Ecuador 49.2 350 5.6 
Egypt 54.7 276 8.0 
El Salvador 21.1 71 1.8 
Gabon 7.0 36 0.4 
Ghana 0.4 1 0.0 
India 16.8 30 1.9 
Indonesia 31.4 110 3.1 
Iran 82.0 994 19.3 
Iraq 53.7 360 5.6 
Kazakhstan 31.9 309 2.5 
Korea 0.2 4 0.0 
Kuwait 81.4 2528 5.1 
Libya 77.9 1188 18.0 
Malaysia 14.6 175 1.6 
Mexico 5.2 42 0.4 
Nigeria 25.4 28 0.9 
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Oman 63.6 1775 9.0 
Pakistan 21.0 37 2.7 
Qatar 68.8 2754 3.0 
Russia 19.6 277 2.1 
Saudi Arabia 78.6 2428 9.5 
Sri Lanka 7.1 16 0.5 
Thailand 4.2 31 0.6 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
37.0 770 3.6 
Turkmenistan 68.4 1474 16.3 
UAE 55.2 1868 4.4 
Ukraine 21.9 142 4.9 
Uzbekistan 58.8 293 14.3 
Venezuela 93.1 1017 15.2 
Vietnam 4.0 11 0.5 
Source: Modified from International Energy Agency, “Energy Subsidies,” 2014, available at  
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energysubsidies/.  Note: Average subsidization 
rate is calculated as the subsidy/reference price of the fuel. 
 
Though difficult to estimate across all sectors (not just fossil fuels) for all countries, 
another review from 1999 calculated that energy subsidies amounted to 21.1 percent of all 
energy prices, in essence subsidizing roughly one-fifth of global consumption.28  They calculated 
that subsidies for fossil fuels and energy exceeded $331 billion in 2000 and that subsidies for 
road transportation amounted to $1,180 billion—a total of $1.5 trillion, or $1.9 trillion updated to 
today’s dollars. Although their methods have been subject to critique, the authors mused that 
these subsidies, among other things, made gasoline cheaper than bottled water.   
The numbers from Myers and Kent may sound high, but even estimates of subsidies 
using very different methodologies have reached similar findings.  A study from the International 
Center for Technology Assessment calculated global energy subsidies at between $627.2 billion 
to $1.9 trillion in 2004.29  More recently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected in 
2013, using an externalities approach, that fossil fuel subsidies amounted to $1.9 trillion on a 
“post-tax basis” globally, equivalent to 8 percent of all government revenue for that year.30  They 
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updated their figures in 2015 to put the amount at $5.3 trillion, or 6.5% of global GDP, with the 
largest subsidies in absolute terms in China ($2.3 trillion), the United States ($699 billion), and 
Russia ($335 billion). 31  If the estimates that energy-related subsidies amounting to more than $1 
trillion per year are accurate, then they are equivalent to the GDP of all low-income countries in 
the world per year.32 
The fiscal, social, and environmental cost of subsides   
 Despite their pervasiveness, such subsidies cultivate a long list of negative social and 
environmental impacts, including larger budget deficits for governments, artificially increased 
waste and reduced efficiency, energy shortages and the exacerbation of poverty, and inflated 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Government deficits   
 The most obvious impact is that subsidies create larger budget deficits and higher taxes, 
diverting funds from potentially better options for fiscal support and programs such as healthcare 
and education.  In India, a study from the World Institute of Sustainable Energy looked at 19 
coal-fired, natural gas, and hydroelectric power plants and calculated that cumulative subsidies 
amounted to 150 percent the cost of the original investment—meaning the subsidies enabled the 
industry to operate at a collective loss to taxpayers and Indian society.33  It is telling in India that 
fuel subsidies for kerosene and liquid propane gas are of the same magnitude as those for 
education.34   Lam et al. more recently determined kerosene subsidies to amount to $200–950 
million, even higher than these earlier projections.35  Similarly, in countries such as Egypt, 
Jordan, and Yemen, energy subsidies represent government expenditures far greater than those 
directed at health and education.36 
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 In the United States, subsidies have enabled some industries to operate at a net 
cumulative loss, operating as a drain on public resources.  Typical examples here are the hidden 
costs subsumed by ratepayers associated with nuclear power plants 37 and uranium enrichment 
facilities.38 39   Subsidies also contribute to smuggling and therefore additional losses of tax 
revenue: Tunisians consume cheaper (illegal) fuel from Algeria, Yemeni oil is smuggled into 
Djibouti, and black market Nigerian fuel is illicitly distributed into many West African 
countries.40 
 As a crude but admittedly effective thought experiment, consider what these billions (and 
possibly trillions) of dollars could otherwise be spent on.  Independent of where the money 
would go, every incremental reduction of a country’s debt strengthens their local currency, 
decreases inflation, increases employment, and decreases the amount of interest on foreign 
loans—and in the United States, the federal government spends $197 billion per year on such 
interest alone, an amount expected to rise to $800 billion by 2020.41  Furthermore, the United 
Nations projects that $19 billion dollars per year is enough for a campaign to eliminate global 
hunger and malnutrition; $12 billion per year, enough for reproductive health care for all women; 
$10 billion per year enough for clean drinking water for all; $5 billion per year for universal 
literacy; $1.3 billion per year for immunizing every child.42  Even if the UN estimates turn out to 
be too low, the potential social gains from subsidy reform could be enormous.  One statistic 
bears repeating: if the world’s potential $1.9 trillion in energy subsidies were repealed tomorrow, 
that would provide enough money to eliminate worldwide hunger and malnutrition one hundred 
times over. (Reasons as to why such countries do not always reform such subsides are given later 
in the paper).  To those who may find these numbers hyperbole, consider that government 
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spending on fossil-fuel subsidies is already close to that of the level of development aid from the 
OECD to the whole world.43 
Increased waste and reduced efficiency  
Generally, subsidies to consumers result in lower end-user prices and increased 
consumption.  This applies even in globally-competitive markets such as oil – with the caveat 
that subsidized supplies may be diverted into black markets and therefore not available to the 
poor.  Producer subsidies in protected markets, due to either interventions or challenges moving 
natural gas or evacuating electricity, work similarly, reducing end-user prices.  Producer 
subsidies to fuels that are broadly traded on global markets (e.g., oil or to some degree coal) tend 
to affect the structure of supply by keeping inefficient producers alive.  These can be one coal 
plant vs another; or coal vs. cleaner replacement fuels.  Most of the time, market prices do not 
materially drop in these cases.   Therefore, depending on the type of subsidy, most generally 
increase levels of consumption far beyond where they would otherwise be.  By lowering the end 
price of energy, subsidies therefore lead to higher energy use, and they also reduce the 
economically rational incentives to properly maintain or meter energy systems and products.   
For example, in the former Soviet Union district heating was often provided far below 
cost—sometimes free—leading people to “waste” heat in a variety of ways, including keeping 
windows open in the winter and growing tropical flowers inside.44 45 According to the IEA, Iran 
spends an annual $66 billion or 20 percent of the country’s GDP in energy subsidies, mostly oil, 
to keep prices low.  Their purpose is to buy off the populace (similar to bread and circuses in 
Roman times), and in some cases to deliver some semblance of a social safety net in a country 
with governments unable to use more sophisticated lump sum transfers that flow only to the 
targeted population subgroup.  A side effect is higher consumption.   Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, 
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and Egypt each also provided oil subsidies of $10-$20 billion in that same year. 46   Oil subsidies 
are even offered in China ($24 billion) and India ($13 billion), major oil-importing nations, 
despite the fact that they encourage excessive consumption that requires more imports.47  
India subsidizes total fossil energy consumption by $21 billion or some $16 per person 
every year—a substantial amount given that 500 million of its people live on less than $2 per 
day.  In India, subsidies for electricity encourage so much waste that the United Nations 
calculated that removing them would cut demand by 34 percent,48 though the political economy 
of this statistic is interesting.  India also has a very high unmet demand for reliable electric 
power, but is plagued with corruption such that power utilities are unable to properly collect bills 
or adjust tariffs.  Thus, there might be a situation where in addition to higher tariffs driving some 
of the very poor to disconnect because of affordability, the ability for the utility to provide more 
reliable and expansive power services to the less-poor population results in higher demand 
despite higher prices.   
In China, subsidies were found to distort prices for coal by an average of 9.9%, with 
average distortions among household prices reported at 24.4% for transport fuels and 11.8% for 
electricity consumption.49  In countries belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council in 
particular—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—
subsidies have led to lower real energy prices, making cheap energy available in turn leading to 
excessive consumption.50   
Additionally, subsidies, by generally manipulating the cost of energy, also erode 
motivations to promote energy efficiency or to conserve energy.  Subsidies on coal production in 
Europe, for example, hamper efforts to improve productivity and capture methane from empty 
coalmines. In the United Kingdom, coal subsidies have slowed the transition to better, safer 
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mines and also discouraged producers from developing better coal pollution equipment. In the 
Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, subsidies have held back innovation in the oil and gas 
sectors.  Guaranteed profits mean operators tend not to invest in upgrades or, at times, 
maintenance.  Similarly, in Russia, the large subsidies for district heating mentioned above 
meant that operators had no incentives to fix leaking steam pipes, did not improve their metering 
and billing practices, and did not invest in insulation and better building envelopes, leading to 
“extreme” inefficiency.51  In the Middle East, governments such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are so heavily dependent on oil subsidies that they need at 
least $80 per barrel to provide public services and cross-subsidize their economies—and some, 
such as Saudi Arabia, encountered budget deficits in 2014.  This contrasts with private 
companies and multinational oil companies such as ExxonMobil and British Petroleum that can 
reputedly turn a profit with oil at $20 per barrel, because they need concern themselves only with 
oil field profitability.52 53 
In other situations, subsidies seem to have little effect at all on energy trends—implying 
that they are a poor value for money.  The U.S. Energy Information Administration conducted an 
in-depth exploration of energy subsidies in the United States, and noted two salient trends.54  
First, the level of subsidies has actually grown considerably over the period examined; the EIA 
estimated that direct energy subsidies doubled from 1999 to 2007 and indirect tax expenditures 
have tripled over the same period.  Second, and oddly, the EIA concluded that the subsidies did 
not really have an impact given global trends.  They had no net result on energy production, 
which the EIA called “virtually unchanged.”  Part of the explanation might be that this is because 
some types of subsidies cancel others out—some, say, encourage energy efficiency, convincing 
customers to save energy, whereas others encourage production and lower prices, convincing 
Global Energy Subsidies 19 
 
customers to use more energy.  They certainly helped particular industries, but resulted in no net 
change for the country.  
Energy shortages and poverty  
Counterintuitively, and perhaps even ironically, subsidies intended to help the poor can 
cause energy shortages and, in some cases, increase poverty. Caps and ceilings on prices clearing 
particular market levels have frequently led to physical shortages of energy (such as that of 
natural gas in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States55) and, at times, government rationing 
programs.  In India, crude oil and oil products are strictly rationed for precisely these reasons, 
and the below-market price delivery of small liquefied petroleum gas cylinders has led to “large 
distortions” in prices and shortages among some 42 million households.56  Similarly, in 
Myanmar, fixed prices for electricity, diesel, and gasoline have resulted in shortages when those 
prices fall below international market levels—convincing suppliers to focus on exports to China 
and Thailand rather than domestic use, and also stripping them of needed revenues to maintain 
and expand their utility infrastructure.57 58 
Subsidies for some fuels such as kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas, natural gas, and 
electricity can worsen levels and intensities of poverty.  In many developing countries, modern 
energy carriers are subsidized for an apparent purpose of improving household living conditions 
by making energy more affordable.  However, Arze del Granado et al. (2012) documented that 
across 20 developing countries, subsidies were in fact regressive. 59  Poorer households 
consumed a disproportionately smaller fraction of the total fuel and electricity supply, and 
households in the top income quintile spent nearly 20 times more (per capita) on most energy 
services.  The study calculated that the bottom income quintile received on average about 7% of 
the overall subsidy benefit, whereas the richest quintile received on average almost 43%.  A 
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review by Lockwood similarly found that only 20 percent of the shares of subsidies received 
globally ended up benefitting the poor, and that in India, of the $22.5 billion spent on fossil fuel 
subsidies in 2010, less than $2 billion benefitted the poorest 20 percent of the population.60 
In concert with these findings, the United Nations warns that instead most of these 
subsidies benefit energy companies, equipment suppliers, and wealthier households in towns and 
cities; not the urban poor and not communities living in rural villages.  As a result, “many 
energy-subsidy programs intended to boost poor households’ purchasing power or rural 
communities’ access to modern energy through lower prices can, paradoxically, leave the poor 
worse off, since the costs are shared by the entire population including the poor.”61  The 
explanation is that poorest households are often unable to afford even subsidized energy, and that 
the poor have lower consumption levels, meaning on a per-unit basis subsidies benefit those with 
higher incomes.  
Externalities and emissions 
Because the bulk of energy subsidies still go towards environmentally damaging fossil 
fuels or environmentally deleterious aspects of the nuclear energy fuel cycle, they also produce 
more externalities and contribute to climate change.   
Looking closely at the numbers in the United States, conventional sources have received 
almost 90 percent of all energy subsidies from 1943 to 1999.62  In 1973, before the energy crisis, 
the federal government awarded 93 percent of its subsidies to fossil energy but only 6 percent to 
energy efficiency, renewable electricity, and other non-nuclear alternatives. Even in fiscal year 
1979, when subsidies for renewable energy peaked at $1.5 billion, subsidies for fossil fuels were 
greater at $1.9 billion and more than 58 percent of the DOE research budget was directed at 
nuclear power.63  Another longitudinal study of U.S. energy subsidies, one going all the back to 
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the 1800s, estimated that nuclear subsidies amounted to more than 1 percent of the entire federal 
budget, that oil and gas subsidies made up one-half to 1 percent of the total budget, but that 
support for cleaner systems such as renewables and energy efficiency have constituted only one 
tenth of one percent.64   More recently, the GAO noted that during the early 2000s that fossil 
energy received 86 percent of government subsidies, nuclear energy 8 percent, and renewables 
and energy efficiency only 6 percent.65 Thus, government policymakers remained heavily 
committed to supporting conventional sources for much of the previous decades.  
Subsidies heavily favoring fossil fuels and conventional energy exist around the world, 
not just in the United States.  When disaggregated by technology, as Figure 2 illustrates with 
IMF data, coal remains the largest single source of post-tax subsidies, reaching 3.9% of global 
GDP in 2015, followed by petroleum, which reached 1.8% of global GDP despite falling 
prices.66   
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Figure 2: International Monetary Fund Estimate of Global Energy Subsidies by Product, 
2011–15 
 
Source: David Coady, Ian Parry, Louis Sears, and Baoping Shang, How Large Are Global 
Energy Subsidies?, IMF Working paper WP/15/105, May, 2015, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15105.pdf 
 
The International Institute for Sustainable Development similarly estimated that three-
quarters of energy subsidies go towards conventional systems such as fossil fuels and nuclear 
power.67  In the OECD as a whole, the bulk of research subsidies also goes (again) towards fossil 
fuels and nuclear power.  Technologies and processes such as Generation IV nuclear reactors, 
combined cycle natural gas turbines and clean coal technologies such as carbon sequestration, 
fluidized gas combustion, and integrated coal gasification combined cycle systems have received 
about $331 billion dollars in research funds from industrialized countries, almost three times the 
$130 billion spent on the entire class of renewables, numbers reflected in Figure 3.68 
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Figure 3: Global Energy Research Expenditures in the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 1974-2014 (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
 
Source: Data compiled from International Energy Agency website, accessed February 2016. 
Thus, because of this favoritism towards fossil fuel, energy subsidies have substantial 
carbon footprints.  As just one example, subsidies for coal in the European Union and Japan are 
responsible for 50 to 100 million extra tons of carbon dioxide emissions per year. 69  In Australia, 
cheap subsidies for coal-fired electricity have resulted in a smelting industry that produces 2.5 
times as many greenhouse gas emissions per ton of manufactured aluminum as the world 
average,70 in addition to whatever distortions flow through the economies of Australia’s Asian 
importers.  The World Bank has estimated that the removal of subsidies for oil, coal, and natural 
gas would immediately reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 9 percent71—more than any 
single national source of annual emissions except for China and the United States.   The IMF 
similarly calculated in 2013 that fossil fuel subsidies result in an extra 4.5 billion tons of carbon 
dioxide emissions from additional energy consumption.72  Another estimate calculated that 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Efficiency Fossil fuels Renewable energy Nuclear Hydrogen Storage Other
Global Energy Subsidies 24 
 
between 1980 and 2010, more than one-third (36%) of global carbon emissions were driven by 
fossil fuel subsidies.73 
Subsidy “lock-in,” “traps,” and “addiction”  
Importantly, subsidies become self-replicating because, once enacted, they continue to 
shape energy choices through the long-lived infrastructure and capital stock they create. This 
justifies further expenditures to operate, maintain, and improve existing technologies. Coal and 
nuclear plants built 40 years ago, for example, still receive subsidies for coal mining and 
uranium enrichment.74  One study referred to this as the energy subsidy “trap:” once a 
government begins subsidizing, such efforts become protected and defended by beneficiaries.75  
Subsidies also have a degree of infectiousness, given that once one country starts 
subsidizing a particular energy fuel or system, others are motivated to respond with their own 
subsidies to compete.   The federal government in the United States subsidizes fossil fuels so 
much that among the 30 industrialized nations forming the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)—including the EU, Japan, Australia, and Korea—it is 
responsible for 70 percent of all subsidies for coal worldwide (when externalities are not 
included).76 This subsidization creates higher demand for fossil fuel imports globally, forcing 
other counties to subsidize their own energy sectors.77  Subsidies in this way create something 
very close to addiction.78  Governments initially favor dispensation of privileges in exchange for 
political support, but grow more dependent on that support over time. 
This trend of subsidy “lock-in” and “dependency” is nicely illustrated with an example of 
subsidies for crude oil in developing countries.  In 2004, crude oil prices climbed to historic 
highs, increasing in price sevenfold only to lose all of their previous gains over the preceding 
five years in a few months.  The World Bank assessed the responses of 49 developing countries 
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to these oil price increases, with a sample of governments spread across Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, and the Middle East. 79  The Bank study found that many governments resorted to 
subsidies in the face of rising prices in an attempt to keep consumers protected.  These new 
subsidies included credits for the exploration and production of oil, tax reductions, agricultural 
subsidies, discounts for passenger transport, price controls for fuel for fisheries, and partial 
compensation for domestic refineries.  China, India, and Mexico alone had $67 billion worth of 
these new subsidies.  However, the study noted that when prices for oil receded, the subsidies 
remained: powerful constituencies had become dependent on them, and consumers resented the 
option of suddenly paying more for energy.  The implication is that enacting subsidies is far 
easier than scaling them back. 
Suggestions for policy reform and political economy  
Clearly, we need to reform and rethink our approach to subsidies.  As the IMF 
underscores in their data, more than ¾ of the underpricing or subsidization of energy is due to 
domestic distortions such as pre-tax subsidies and domestic pricing regimes, rather than global 
issues such as climate change.80  This suggests that national policymakers hold incredible sway 
over the scope and duration of their subsidies.  This section of the paper considers multiple 
policy options for reform: best practices in measurement, subsidy repeal, impact studies, 
adjustment packages, learning from previous successes, and appreciating the overarching 
salience of political economy.   
Adopting best practices in subsidy measurement 
 Best practices in subsidy measurement and estimation exist, and they offer useful 
guidance for independent analysts and governments. Subsidy data and analysis should be 
transparent, complete, and comparable, and calculations both relatively easy to carry out and 
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replicable. 81  Kojima and Koplow emphasize that best practice in subsidy estimation and 
aggregation methods usually adhere to the following characteristics:   
 Consistency across estimators. Both within a country and internationally, subsidy 
measurement results should reflect the policies in place, regardless of who is doing the 
estimation; 
 Consistency across sectors.  Cross-sectoral comparison requires meticulous attention to 
detail to ensure that the same methods are applied despite substantially and even 
qualitatively different market conditions, sector structure, and key policy questions; 
 Transparency about assumptions, baselines, and boundaries. Part of ensuring this 
consistency is for assumptions on key inputs and boundaries to be clearly stated.  This 
should include information about the data sources, timing, and required adjustments for 
reference price calculations; 
 Aggregation: Being able to combine data elements in a consistent manner enables an 
analysis of broader patterns;  
 Data availability at different levels. Examining data on a more granular level if 
possible, be it by geographic region, beneficiaries (by fuel type, industry, consumer or 
producer), type of support mechanism, or other attributes, can lead to more nuanced 
analysis;  
 Consistency and availability over time. Subsidy estimates change from year to year as 
the economic and policy environment shifts. World energy prices, government policy, 
energy extraction or consumption rates, and a variety of other factors all affect the 
magnitude of subsidies. A tracking system needs to provide consistent data over a 
sufficient period in order to provide the necessary base for subsidy analysis and reform; 
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 Provision of estimation range. While budgetary transfers can usually be measured 
precisely, many other types of subsidies cannot. Estimate variance can be considerable, 
and it is useful visualize ranges in the reported calculations. Such disclosure can also help 
prioritize the areas in which analytical work can improve estimation accuracy.  
In addition, three other aspects can complement these best practices: mixed methods 
approaches, peer-review, and sunset clauses:  
 Recognize complementary methods. Many of the techniques mentioned above—price-
gap, inventory, and externality approaches—tend to be used independently from each 
other.  However, these methods are often complementary and should be used more 
together.  Differences in valuation can also reveal underlying assumptions and make 
transparent data gaps; 
 Conduct subsidy peer-review.  Voluntary, bottom-up, cross-country peer reviews of 
subsidies have already begun to lead to improvements in valuation and legitimacy.  China 
and the United States started in 2016 a cross-departmental, cross-sector peer review of 
fossil fuel subsidies through a group of experts. They will systematically examine the 
state of subsidies, undertaken with the aim of building a long-term domestic energy and 
subsidy strategy.  In 2014 and 2015, New Zealand and Peru similarly reviewed each 
other’s fossil fuel subsidies, leading to increased awareness about their impacts.82 
 Sunset clauses.  The insertion of sunset clauses into regulation can set an explicit 
expiration date and prevents subsidies from operating indefinitely.  It also gives 
stakeholders a clear expectation about when a subsidy would end, reducing the risk of 
dependency and lock-in.83  The United Kingdom placed a sunset clause on their 
reintroduction of coal subsidies in 2000—intended to bolster the competitiveness of the 
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mining industry—explicitly stating that those subsidies would expire in 2002.  Similar 
sunset clauses and explicit expiration dates have existed for production tax credits for 
both nuclear power and renewable energy, for better or for worse, in the United States, 
implemented under the Energy Policy Acts of 1992 and 2005.  Sunset provisions could 
alsobe an early step towards complete elimination of such support. 
Eliminating inappropriate subsidies  
Elimination of subsidies could be complete, meaning a government would abolish every 
type of subsidy, across the board.  A second variant would be more targeted, removing subsidies 
only for “conventional,” “dirty,” or “undesirable” energy systems such as oil, coal, natural gas, 
and possibly nuclear power.  A third variant would be to remove “perverse subsidies.”  These are 
subsidies that harm both the economy and the environment.  Examples include those that: 
 Maintain production processes that would otherwise be uneconomic, such as subsidies to 
grow corn for ethanol in arid areas; 
 Produce un-usable surpluses, such as the “lakes” of butter, milk, and wheat commonly 
discarded in the 1980s; 
 Deter efforts at environmental sustainability, such as subsidies for the harvesting of old-
growth forests for heating fuel instead of a shift towards forest management, 
afforestation, or reforestation; 
 Stimulate activity that degrade natural resources underpinning agriculture and economic 
growth, such as subsidies for electric irrigation systems in places that otherwise should 
not grow crops.84 
Removing all, some, or only the most “perverse” subsidies has the potential alter energy markets 
for the better.  Myers and Kent estimated (many years ago) that the removal of “perverse” 
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subsidies would immediately cut energy consumption by 3.5 percent and reduce emissions by 
4.6 percent per year, and also increase global welfare by $35 billion and increase real income for 
the world by 0.7 percent.85   Another group of economists calculated that by merely cutting fuel 
subsidies for gasoline by 80 percent, global demand for oil would immediately drop by 5 
percent—the equivalent of removing 2.5 million barrels of oil a day from the market (at that 
time).86   
 Although they vary based on their methods, assumptions, and scope, we see similar 
consensus among more recent studies suggesting that subsidy removal will significantly cut 
greenhouse gas emissions.  The International Energy Agency’s estimates suggest that the 
removal of subsidies for energy consumption in a group of eight developing economies would 
reduce energy use by 13 percent, reduce carbon dioxide emissions 16 percent, and raise incomes 
by 1 percent in aggregate.87  The IMF correspondingly estimated that removing fossil fuel 
subsidies would cut global emissions of carbon dioxide, and other health-damaging pollutants 
such as sulfur dioxide, by 13 percent.88  Merrill et al. compiled a list of almost a dozen separate 
studies all showing greenhouse gas emissions reductions from subsidy removal to range from 6.4 
percent to 13 percent globally and from 1.3 percent to 9.3 percent for countries such as China, 
India, Indonesia, and Thailand.89  Their results are summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Estimated Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions associated with Subsidy 
Removal 
 
Name Year Scope 
country 
Scope Fuel Comments on 
modeled 
scenarios and 
assumptions 
Emission 
reduction 
Methodology 
International 
Energy 
Agency  
2014 Global Consumer 
Fossil- fuel 
subsidies 
(FFS), IEA data 
IEA 
recommends 
in order to 
keep the rise 
in temperature 
below 2°C is 
the “further 
partial phase 
out of FFS to 
end-
consumers” 
(part of the 4-
for-2°C 
scenario). IEA 
calculates that 
this package 
of measures 
will account 
for 80 per cent 
of the GHG 
emissions 
reduction that 
is necessary to 
achieve the 
2degree goal, 
equivalent to a 
reduction of 
3.1Gt of 
carbon dioxide 
equivalent. 
360 Mt carbon 
dioxide  
equivalent will 
be the reduction 
of the 
implementation 
of the 4-for-2°C 
scenario 
World Energy 
Model 
Asian 
Development 
Bank 
2014 India Petroleum 
(diesel, liquid 
petroleum gas 
[LPG], 
kerosene), 
electricity, 
Coal 
For all 
models and 
projections in 
the ADB 
report, 
assumptions 
were made in 
terms of GDP 
growth, 
population 
growth and 
fossil-fuel 
price growth. 
1.8 per cent 
(MARKAL) 
and 1.3 per 
cent (E3MG) 
by 2030 
MARKAL and 
E3MG 
Asian 
Development 
Bank 
2014 Indonesia Petroleum 
(gasoline, 
diesel, LPG, 
kerosene), 
electricity 
Emissions 
savings 
come from 
lower 
demand for 
energy and 
a change in 
energy 
mix. 
5.1 per cent 
(MARKAL) and 
9.3 per cent 
(E3MG) by 2030 
MARKAL and 
E3MG 
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Asian 
Development 
Bank 
2014 Thailand Diesel, 
LPG, 
natural 
gas 
(vehicles), 
electricity 
Emissions 
savings come 
from lower 
demand for 
energy and a 
change in 
energy mix. 
2.8 per cent 
(MARKAL) by 
2025 
MARKAL 
Burniaux & 
Chateau  
2011, 
2014 
37 non- 
OECD 
countries+ 
Korea + 
Mexico 
FFS 
consumer, 
IEA data 
Covers 37 
countries 
(covering 95 
per cent of 
globalized 
fossil-fuel 
consumption). 
If subsidies are 
removed 
gradually 
between 2013 
and 2020 in the 
countries of 
which the data 
was modelled. 
Global GHG 
emissions of an 
8 per cent 
reduction by 
2050 
OECD ENV-
Linkages 
General 
Equilibrium 
model 
Lin & 
Ouyang 
2014 China Coal, oil, gas, 
electricity 
consumer 
subsidies. Price 
gap approach 
IEA price gap 
approach, 
calculation of 
subsidies for the 
period 2006–
2010. Price 
elasticity of 
different fuels in 
China based on 
econometric 
models.   
. 
3.72 per cent carbon 
dioxide emission 
reduction (based on 
Partial Equilibrium 
Model).  Significant 
carbon dioxide and 
sulfur dioxide 
emission 
reductions 
Partial Equilibrium 
Model 
and computable 
general 
equilibrium 
(CGE) model 
Schwanitz et 
al.  
2014 Global IEA data Different 
scenarios on 
climate policy 
dimension and 
the degree of 
phasing-out 
fossil-fuel 
subsidies are 
being modelled. 
lead to 
reductions as 
well. 
6.4 per cent 
GHG emission 
reductions in 
the Zero2020 
scenario by 
2050 
REMIND 
(intertemporal 
energy – 
economy 
model) 
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International 
Monetary 
Fund  
2013 Global Petroleum, 
natural gas, 
coal, 
Assumptions 
in the model 
include one 
price elasticity 
per fossil fuel, 
one carbon 
dioxide 
coefficient per 
unit fossil fuel. 
carbon 
dioxide, 
sulphur 
dioxide and 
local 
pollutants 
emission 
reductions 
based on 
reduced 
consumption 
and the carbon 
dioxide 
coefficient. 
13 per cent 
decrease in 
carbon dioxide 
emissions (4.5 
billion tons); 
reduction of 10 
million tons of 
SO2; further 13 
per cent 
reduction in 
other local 
pollutants. 
IMF Model for 
carbon 
dioxide, SO2 
and local 
pollutants’ 
emission 
reductions 
APEC Energy 
Working 
Group  
2012 APEC FFS 
consumer, 
IEA data for 
APEC region 
Study refers 
back to OECD 
and IEA model: 
Phase out 
results in 
carbon 
dioxide 
emission 
reduction of 
4.7 per cent 
by 2020 and 
5.8 per cent 
by 2035  
 
Phase-out 
results in 
carbon dioxide 
emission 
reduction of 10 
per cent by 
2050 globally.  
Reduction in 
Russia and 
Eastern 
European 
countries 
would be up to 
20 per cent 
and have 
largest effect 
OECD – IEA 
models 
OECD 2011 Global FFS 
consumer, 
IEA 2008 
data (incl. 
input for 
electricity) 
Phasing out 
FFS consumer 
subsidies in 
developing 
and emerging 
countries can 
lead to global 
reduction of 
GHG emissions 
of 6 per cent 
6 per cent 
global 
reduction by 
2050 20 per 
cent reduction 
in Russia and 
MENA 
countries 
ENV-Linkages 
model 
Anderson & 
McKibbin  
2000 Global Coal Phase-out of 
coal subsidies 
(production 
and 
consumption) 
in OECD and 
non-OECD 
countries 
8 per cent 
reduction in 
carbon dioxide 
emissions 
CGE Model 
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Stefanski  2014 Global Emissions 
intensity 
Comparison of 
emissions 
intensities to 
GDP and 
historical 
development 
over time to 
understand if 
distortions are 
linked to the 
presence of 
fossil-fuel 
subsidies 
Model finds far 
larger and 
indirect 
subsidies to 
fossil fuels of 
around 
$983 billion in 
2010. 
 
36 per cent of 
global carbon 
emissions 
between 1980 
and 2010 were 
driven by 
subsidies and 
that GDP was 
up to 1.7 per 
cent lower per 
year because 
of the 
distortive 
subsidies. 
A model of 
structural to the 
experiences of 
the UK. 
 
Source: Modified from Laura Merrill, Melissa Harris, Liesbeth Casier, and Andrea M. Bassi, 
Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Climate Change, Options for policy makers within their Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions, Nordic Working Papers, 2015.  Note: FFS = fossil fuel 
subsidy.   
Conducting subsidy impact studies 
Rather than fully repealing subsidies, governments and communities could conduct 
subsidy impact studies to better determine the costs and benefits of particular subsidies, and 
which ones could be revised or repealed.  As the United Nations Environment Program has 
suggested, making on-budget costs transparent and properly accounted for can enhance public 
dialogue and even inform policymakers of hidden subsidies.90  Such subsidy studies, apart from 
revealing financial flows, could include standardized ways of defining subsidies, tracking them 
and publishing data about them, and creating an international framework of independent 
monitors to continuously evaluate them.91  Subsidy impact studies could even be published 
visibly in places such as the Federal Register in the United States, where they would be subject 
to public commenting.92  Such studies may show that rather than removing subsidies entirely, 
they instead need tweaked: perhaps given to households or poor customers themselves, rather 
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through intermediaries such as oil and gas companies or utilities, or shifted from dirtier or less 
efficient energy systems to cleaner and more efficient ones.  
As a positive sign, many efforts are already underway to conduct more rigorous studies 
about subsidy impacts.  At the 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit, the leaders of the twenty largest 
developed and developing nations agreed to “phase out and rationalize over the medium term 
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while providing targeted support to the poorest.”93  As a 
complement to this reporting, they asked the IEA, OECD, Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, and World Bank to undertake their own assessments of the impacts of fossil fuel 
subsidies.  The scope of such assessments envelops examining the level of subsidization, 
proposed reforms, and, critically, the aggregate economic, energy, and environmental impacts of 
those subsidies.    In parallel, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) process has catalyzed in better reporting and 
analysis of subsidy impacts.94   As of November 2015, 39 countries had submitted analysis of 
energy and fossil fuel subsidies (and some of their consequent impacts) as part of their Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) examined in advance of COP 21 in Paris, France. 
Going beyond these efforts, one innovative option is a Public Registry of Basic 
Information About Subsidies.  This concept bears some similarity to the Public Registry of 
Natural Resource Stock Depletion (and other forms of natural resource accounting) advocated as 
an improvement to Gross National Product calculations.95 96 97 This registry, managed by local 
and national governments, could track and register the manner in which subsidies are 
implemented, who has jurisdiction over them, their annual cost, and citations to relevant legal 
authorities.  Regulators could consider subsidies that do not appear on the registry null and void 
after a certain period, forcing all departments and ministries to reveal a complete set of costs.98  
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In parallel would be Subsidy Justification Analyses defending any subsidies on the registry 
deemed beneficial enough to be considered for renewal.99 
Implementing adjustment packages 
Another pragmatic solution is to provide adjustment packages for those most harmed 
from subsidy removal—an action that undercuts some of the political opposition against the 
elimination of subsidies.  For instance, if one is cutting back a subsidy for offshore deepwater oil 
and gas platforms, the funds gained could be used to help train the soon-to-be unemployed 
workers in other skills, or provide them with medical insurance or unemployment benefits for an 
extended period of time.  Though outside of the energy sector, the Australian dairy industry, for 
example, relied on an adjustment package funded by subsidy removal which gave technical 
assistance to farmers wishing to leave the industry, and grants to communities where dairy was 
central to local economies.100 
Similarly, the German federal government and state of North Rhine-Westphalia removed 
their subsidies for coal exports over a twelve-year period of 1997 to 2008, phasing in reductions 
slowly so that subsidies shrunk from €4.73 billion to €2.38 billion with a complete removal 
scheduled (though not guaranteed) for 2018.  Proceeds from some of the saved revenues were 
put into an adjustment package for miners that had lost their jobs. The result of the removal 
included a reduction in operating mines from 19 to eight, a reduction in production from 46 
million tons to 26 million tons, and the number of mining jobs reduced from 78,100 to 38,500, 
though for most the retraining was successful and they were able to find employment in other 
sectors.101  Across the United Kingdom, coal miners in the 1980s were offered large “redundancy 
payments” in ballots organized by the National Coal Board, and these offers were accepted even 
at the most militant pits who were opposed to government plans.  Subsidy reform packages 
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introduced by Iran, Namibia, the Philippines, and Turkey also had similar compensating 
measures to affected stakeholders, and no less than eight other national instances of reform relied 
on targeted cash transfers to vulnerable groups.102   
Learning from successful case studies 
Though rare, energy subsidy removal has been done successfully before.  Several 
European states depicted in Table 5 repealed reduced value added tax (VAT) rates to coal, fuel 
oil, natural gas, and electricity providers over the previous three decades.  These artificially low 
VAT rates had been implemented to benefit poor households—similar to low VATs given on 
other “basic needs” such as food.  However, the VAT subsidies were eliminated when it was 
discovered that most of their benefits went to the rich, rather than the poor, since the wealthy 
tended to consume more energy, and that removal had only a negligible impact on energy market 
prices but saved drastic amounts of tax revenue for the governments involved.103   
Table 5: VAT Energy Subsidies Removed in Europe, 1983-2005 
Country Type of subsidy removed Year(s) 
Coal Fuel Oil Natural Gas Electricity 
Austria X X X X 1983 
Belgium  X X X 1980 to 1983 
Czech Republic X X X X 1994 to 1997 
Greece X X X  1992 to 1998 
Hungary  X X X 2003 to 2005 
Italy  X X  1984 to 1988 
Poland X X X X 1998 
Portugal  X   1996 to 2001 
Slovakia X X X X 2003 
Source: Modified from European Commission, Reforming Environmentally Harmful Subsidies 
(UK: Institute for European Environmental Policy, March, 2007). 
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 The author’s own compilation of successful subsidy energy reforms is offered in Table 6.  
These examples cover 25 countries over the past sixty years.  Their efforts do suggest that 
subsidy removal and reform can bring substantial positive impacts on energy prices or national 
economic development.  As a drawback, a key issue on the all of the subsidy reform examples is 
whether changes are observed effects of limited policy change or falling world reference prices, 
or whether laws were actually changed to prevent backsliding.  And while adjustment packages 
may have worked for Western Europe and countries such as those in Table 6, complementary 
policies may need a totally different approach for countries like Angola, Nigeria, or Venezuela, 
which are not on the list.  
Table 6: Successful Examples of National Subsidy Reform, 1952 to 2016 
Country Year(s) Energy 
Source 
Description/Result  
Armenia 1994 Electricity Scaled back electricity subsidies by 22 percent of GDP 
from 1994 to 2004 
Brazil 1990-
2002 
Oil and gas Lowered subsidies for oil and gas from 0.8 percent of 
GDP to revenue generating in 2002 
Brazil 1993-
2003 
Electricity Lowered subsidies equivalent to 0.7 percent of GDP 
Chile 1995 Coal Removed its subsidies after it became apparent that 
coal production prices were extraordinarily high ($95 
per ton) compared to other countries ($54 in Brazil, 
$52 for the United States).  The removal actually 
raised incomes by almost 1 percent among all Chilean 
households and cut emissions of carbon dioxide and 
particulate matter by nearly 8 percent 
China 2015 Oil and 
gas, 
electricity 
To advance the reform in the pricing and taxation 
regime for energy- and resource-based products, China 
plans to revoke selected fossil fuel subsidies so that 
emissions drop 0.78% per year by 2020 
Egypt  2014 Oil and 
gas, 
electricity 
Policy is implemented using four pillars, namely: set 
different prices for petroleum products based on 
energy generation efficiency; increase the efficiency of 
energy use; provide support to certain sectors to 
promote switching from conventional energy sources 
to clean energy sources; and apply the fuel subsidy 
smartcard system to ensure that subsidies are received 
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by target beneficiaries.  Projected to reduce emissions 
by 14.88% by 2020.   
Ghana 2005 Oil and gas Removed subsidies to the degree that they realigned 
the price of energy by 50 percent 
Indonesia 2005-
2009, 
2013 
Oil and gas Subsidies declined from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2005 to 
0.8 percent in 2009, though they increased recently in 
2013 due to protests 
Jordon 2005-
2012 
Oil and gas Gradually removed all fossil fuel subsidies by 2008, 
resulting in price increases ranging from 16% for 
gasoline to 76.5% for LPG.  Energy subsidies declined 
from 5.8% of GDP in 2005, to 2.6% in 2006, to 0.4% 
in 2010 while in in November 2012 the government 
of Jordan announced that it had removed the remaining 
subsidies on oil products 
Iran 2010 Oil and gas Reduced annual growth in the national consumption of 
petroleum products to zero 
Kenya 2001-
2008 
Electricity Subsidies dropped from 1.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 
0 percent in 2008 
Mauritania 2011 Oil and gas Subsidies declined from 2 percent of GDP to close to 
zero in one year 
Morocco  2015 Electricity Has carefully reformed subsidies whilst at the same 
time expanding investment into renewable energy 
through ambitious targets and to people through the 
development of a national safety net. Carbon 
emissions expected to decline 6.6% by 2030 
Namibia 1997 Oil and gas Removed subsidies equal to about 0.1 percent of GDP 
Niger 2011 Oil and gas Removed subsidies equivalent to 0.9 percent of GDP 
Nigeria 2011-
2012 
Oil and gas Subsidies declined from 4.7 percent of GDP to 3.6 
percent of GDP 
Peru 2010 Oil and gas Lowered subsidies for petroleum equivalent to 0.1 
percent of GDP 
Philippines 1996 Oil and gas Government successfully removed energy subsidies 
equivalent to 0.1 percent of national GDP 
Philippines 2001-
2006 
Electricity Subsidies dropped from 1.5 percent of national GDP to 
0 percent  
Poland 1998 Coal Forced the coal sector to improve its efficiency and 
substantially reduced fiscal transfers  
South 
Africa 
1952-
1957 
Oil and gas Successfully avoided subsidies and still secured energy 
supply 
Turkey 1998 Electricity Removal of fossil fuel subsidies put competitive 
pressure on electricity suppliers and turned their net 
losses into profitability  
Uganda 1999 Electricity Subsidies declined equivalent to the amount of 2.1 
percent of GDP 
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United 
Arab 
Emirates 
2014 Oil and 
gas, 
electricity 
Has introduced a new fuel pricing policy, which will 
put the UAE in line with global prices to support the 
national economy, lower fuel consumption and protect 
the environment. Fossil fuel subsidies will decline 
14.41% by 2020 
Yemen 2005-
2010 
Oil and gas Subsidies dropped from 8.7 percent of GDP in 2005 to 
7.4 percent in 2011 
Source: Compiled by the author from International Monetary Fund 2013; United Nations 
Environment Program, Energy Subsidies: Lessons Learned in Assessing Their Impact and 
Designing Policy Reforms (New York: UN Foundation, 2004); Laura Merrill and Vivian Chung. 
2015. Financing the Sustainable Development Goals through Fossil-fuel Subsidy Reform: 
Opportunities in Southeast Asia, India and China (Manitoba. Canada: IISD); Anika Terton, 
Philip Gass, Laura Merrill, Armin Wagner and Eike Meyer. Fiscal Instruments in INDCs: How 
countries are looking to fiscal policies to support INDC implementation (Manitoba, Canada: 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, December 2015); and Laura Merrill, Andrea 
M. Bassi, Richard Bridle and Lasse T. Christensen. Tackling Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Climate 
Change: Levelling the energy playing field (Oslo: Norden, 2015). 
Recognizing political economy  
Subsidy reform by itself has its own set of risks, and it must be designed to ensure that 
winners are maximized and losers minimaxed.  Reform must also ensure that the poor or 
vulnerable are not further marginalized.  Beaton et al. note that risks to subsidy reform include 
short-term shocks to national GDP, rises in inflation, and reductions in international 
competitiveness of fuel-consuming sectors such as energy, agriculture, and transport.104  If 
subsidy benefits were directed primarily at poor households, then their removal can have a 
regressive effect, lowering income. It can also create increases in poverty when subsidy removal 
results in unemployment associated with affected business sectors. Merrill and Chung note that: 
In the process of moving towards fossil-fuel subsidy reform, it is necessary to shift away 
from universal welfare programs based on discounted fossil fuels and towards the 
implementation of long-term targeted social welfare programs in health, education and 
assistance to the poor …. Temporary cash transfers or other compensation policies may 
also be needed to mitigate the impacts of rising fuel prices within the population directly, 
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depending on the fuel in question and the impacts that higher prices will have on low 
income and vulnerable groups.105 
In extreme cases, subsidy reform and removal can result in violent, social conflict.  In 2012, for 
example, Nigeria removed subsidies on petrol and diesel worth about $8 billion per year, and 
consequently retail prices doubled almost overnight.106 There were immediate protests on the 
streets of Nigeria’s major cities, and these quickly escalated into violence.  Similar violent 
conflicts related to reductions in fossil fuel subsidies have also occurred in India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, and Sudan.   
 For these reasons, the political economy dimensions to subsidy reform need more 
attention.  These political economic challenges can involve a range of factors, including:  
 Potential hardship on the poor and vulnerable who might be heavily dependent on the 
subsidies, particularly in the case of kerosene or gas; 
 Influential stakeholders, especially fossil fuel subsidies that benefit the upper and middle 
classes and industry disproportionately; 
 Macroeconomic impacts, such as the inflationary effect reforms can have on energy 
prices and cost increases being passed onto consumers; 
 Reduced competitiveness and higher fuel and electricity prices may necessitate costly 
energy-efficiency investments, affecting costs and output in manufacturing; 
 Structural shifts that may result from the loss of competitiveness of energy intensive 
industries may cause job losses and reductions in employment; 
 Poor households can be forced to substitute or shift to inferior fuels because they are 
cheaper, with sobering health and environmental impacts; 
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 Governance, accountability, and service quality can also decline if subsidies were a 
lifeline to ensuring basic maintenance and operation of energy systems.107 
Crucially, the above adverse effects (and associated political challenges) will vary significantly 
depending on the type of subsidy.  In a review of 22 case studies of subsidy reform, the IMF 
found that only in 12 cases did reform efforts not cause some type of significant economic or 
social disruption.108   
Conclusions and future research  
Ultimately, the hidden toll that energy subsidies can take on social welfare, economic 
growth, and even technological innovation needs to become more visible.  Best practices in 
subsidy measurement and data collection, subsidy impact studies, and adjustment packages offer 
local and national planners a set of tools they can calibrate to decide on whether particular 
subsidies ought to be reformed or simply eliminated.  However, reforms are more likely to be 
successful in periods of political or social change and crisis, or when national goals align with 
those of regional bodies such as the European Union. Moreover, mitigating measures for 
subsidies ought to be built-into policy packages at the outset, given that subsidy reforms will 
always generate some losers.109 
 Thus, we need a more complete energy subsidies research agenda that includes continual 
work on updating best practice methodologies in measurement and valuation alongside efforts 
that look at politics, social protection, revenue distribution and reform strategies.  Rentschler and 
Bazilian thoughtfully propose such an agenda in Figure 4.110  That agenda includes enhanced 
understanding about the determinants of successful reforms. Concrete country-level studies for 
all major subsidizing economies are warranted and potential price shocks need to be understood 
with respect to their variability across income groups, geographical locations, and occupations.  
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The evidence and consequent public awareness has been disproportionately focused on 
consumption subsidies, whereas producer subsidies – particularly in developed countries – 
remain insufficiently researched and reformed. There is also a need to evaluate the role of 
subsidy reforms as part of comprehensive climate change policy packages, and as a tool for deep 
emissions reductions.   
Figure 4: Elements of an Integrated Research Agenda on Global Energy Subsidies and 
Subsidy Reform 
 
Source: Jun Rentschler & Morgan Bazilian (2016): Reforming fossil fuel subsidies: drivers, 
barriers and the state of progress, Climate Policy (in press 2016). 
 
Critically, and lastly, is to keep a focus on political economy. We must keep the politics 
underlying both subsidy implementation and subsidy reform in view.  We must also keep in 
mind that it is, as Lockwood puts it, “precisely in those countries in which subsidies need the 
most reform where the credibility of the general reform intention and of specific reform 
strategies is the weakest.”111  This suggests new research questions around the topic of “second-
best” or “hybrid” reform strategies, the achievable over the possible, the pragmatic over the 
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perfect.  Subsidies can be blunt instruments that result in wide-ranging social, economic, and 
environmental repercussions. It should come as no surprise that their repeal also creates similar 
drifts, currents, and ruptures that we are only beginning to comprehend.   
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